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Part-01 Industrial Policy in East Asia
Industrial Policy: Literature Review
Schools Insights on sector identification and promotion
Developmental state 
(Johnson 1982; Amsden
1989; Wade 1990)
Government picks winners (in consultation with 
business).
Rent-seeking
(Krueger 1974)
Government can’t and shouldn’t pick winners.
(Self-fulfilling incompetence and corruption?)
Self-discovery
(Rodrik 2007)
Winners pick themselves, with help from search 
and problem-solving networks.
New structural economics
(Lin and Monga 2010)
Latecomers can pick winners in mature industries 
by benchmarking early movers (based on CA).
Product space
(Hidalgo et al. 2007)
Winners are readily identifiable, but how do we go 
from the periphery to the core?
Strategic risk-taking Winners are readily identifiable, but the key is 
to take strategic risks, weighing the challenges of 
skill accumulation, scale economies, and 
complementary investments against the possibility 
of capacity underutilization and financial distress.
4Trade and productivity growth in East Asia
• Lucas (1993), “Making a Miracle”, Econometrica
– Focusing on East Asian miracle economies as “large scale 
exporters of manufactured goods of increasing 
sophistication”
– (1) The main engine of growth is the accumulation human 
capital, especially in the form of learning-by-doing on the job;
– (2) For such learning to persist, workers and managers 
should continue to take on new tasks; 
– (3) For such learning to continue on a large scale, the 
economy must be a large scale exporter.
5Industrial Policy in Korea
 IP for Export Promotion
 IP with Effective Monitoring and Evaluation
 IP as a Public-Private Partnership
 IP in a Rapid Evolution
 Outward-Oriented, Bottom-up, Integrated Industrial Policy
 Discover latent and potential comparative advantage through 
experimentation and international benchmarking.  
 Positively reinforce successful experiments and phase out unsuccessful 
experiments by providing performance-based rewards.
 Systematically study what has to be done to fill the missing links in the 
domestic value chain and move up the quality ladder, and make 
concerted efforts to aim for international competitiveness from the outset.
 Take strategic risks, weighing the challenges of skill accumulation, scale 
economies, and complementary investments against the possibility of 
capacity underutilization and financial distress. 
 Inward-Oriented, Top-down, Ad Hoc Industrial Policy
 Promote upstream industries with large spillovers (“Big Push” through 
coordinated domestic industrialization).  
 Go top-down.  Disregard feedback.
 Problem: Insufficient Demand, Suboptimal-Scale Plants, Higher Costs, 
Monumental Projects
Industrial Policy Approaches
Korea retained the ownership of its export-oriented industrialization and 
progressively developed its own capabilities to add value and manage risks 
even as it actively learned from, and engaged with, the outside world.   
 Two-Tier Approach to Coordination and Innovation
 Government: National-Level Coordination and Innovation
 Chaebol: Group-Level Coordination and Innovation
 Big-Push Partnership: Information and Risk Sharing
 International Trade as an Essential Component
 Coordination
 Scale Economies: Overcoming the Limits of Domestic Market
 Market Test and Reward Based on Performance in a Competitive Setting: 
Less Prone to Political Influence and Manipulation 
 Learning by Exporting: Upgrading Mechanism
 Containment of Corruption and Rent-Seeking
 Changes in Political Economy (1960-61)
 Meritocracy, Monitoring, and Incentives
Korea’s Big-Push Partnership: 
Government and Business Groups
Part-02 Trade and Industrialization in Korea
7 Five-Year Economic 
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Industrialization: GDP share
11
Industrialization: Employment share
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Industrialization: How Long Did It Take?
1960 1970 1990 20001980
HCI Product
Agricultural 
Product
Light 
Industry 
Product
50%
Wig Automobile SemiconductorTextile
Semiconductor, 
Mobile Phone, 
DTV, Display, 
Automobile, Ship-
building, etc.
80%
14%
6%
Changes in Export Commodity Profile
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
1 Iron Ore Textiles Textiles Electronics Semiconductors
2 Tungsten Ore Plywood Electronics Textiles Computers
3 Raw Silk Wigs Iron and Steel Products Footwear Automobiles
4 Anthracite Iron Ore Footwear Iron and Steel Products
Petrochemical 
Products
5 Cuttlefish Electronics Ships Ships Ships
6 Live Fish Fruits and Vegetables Synthetic Fibers Automobiles
Wireless 
Telecommunication 
Equipment
7 Natural Graphite Footwear Metal Products Chemicals Iron and Steel Products
8 Plywood Tobacco Plywood General Machines Textile Products
9 Rice Iron and Steel Products Fish Plastic Products Textile Fabrics
10 Bristles Metal Products Electrical Goods Containers Electronics Home Appliances
Korea’s Top 10 Exports: 
Evidence on Industrial Upgrading 
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Export Structure
16
Manufacturing Structure
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Exports and Imports (1953-2009)
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Inflows of grants, loans, and FDI (1953-2009)
Part-02 Evolution of Trade Policy in Korea
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Import-Substitution in the 1950s
 One of the poorest country in the world
 Pursued import-substitution industrialization
 “Three white” industries etc.
 Limited by the small size of domestic market 
 Dependent on foreign aid
 50% of government expenditure, 70% of import 
 Domestic currency overvalued, import regulated
 Lack of foreign currency for investment
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Export-Promotion in the 1960s
 First 5-year economic development plan (1962- )
 To end the vicious circle of poverty 
 Rapid export expansion started
 Three devaluations triggered export expansion  
 Export drive by strong export promotion policy
 Export targets (1962), monthly export promotion meetings 
(1964), Korea Trade Promotion Agency (KOTRA, 1962)  
 Comprehensive Export Promotion Program (1964)
 Subsidies, tax incentives, credit incentives, tariff rebates …
 All abolished by the 1980s (too costly; countervailing duties)
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Promoting HCIs in the 1970s
 Government-led HCI promotion
 To promote the defense industry for self-defense
 To catch up Japan in HCIs
 To respond to increased protectionism in light industries
 To achieve import-substitution in capital goods
 Top-down approach towards private firms
 Long-term policy loans at preferential rates with tax benefits
 Public investment in human capital and infrastructure
 Giving favors to large enterprise groups (“Chaebol”)
 Temporary import-substitution measures to protect HCIs
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Stabilization / Liberalization in the 1980s
 Drastic change in policy directions
 From growth to stability
 From government-led to private-sector-led
 Macroeconomic stabilization
 Comprehensive Economic Stabilization Program (1979)
 Industrial rationalization
 Financial liberalization
 Market opening
24
Marginal effective tax rates on corporate income
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Trend in R&D expenditure
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Import liberalization
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Korea’s tariff rates (1978-2007)
Part-03 Case Study: Automotive Industry
Korea’s industrial policy involve top down / economy wide directives for 
technological upgrading and achievement of international scale 
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Industry 1st 5 Year Plan
1962-66
2nd 5 Year Plan
1967-71
3rd 5 Year Plan
1972-76
4th 5 Year
Plan
1977-81
5th 5 Year Plan
1982-86
Basic Policy 
Direction
•Onset of 
industrialization 
•Export-first
principle
•Development of 
import substitution 
industries 
•Strengthening of the 
international competitiveness of 
light industry
•Domestic production of 
industrial raw materials
•Introduction and absorption of 
technologies (KIST)
•$10bn exports
•Proclamation of HCI 
(development six leading 
industries)
•Proclamation of domestic 
development of 
technologies, education of 
technological  manpower
•Expansion 
of research 
facilities
•industrial 
rationalizatio
n (energy 
saving)
•International
class
•Precision 
•Plant export
Light Import substitution Establishment of export 
oriented infrastructure
Export maximization Saving
energy
Intl. scale
Chemical Cement /Fertilizer/ 
Oil refinery
Petrochem. Complex Methanol Plant Fine chemical 
industry
Metal Iron & steel mukk Intl. scale (20-
60mn tons)
Shipbuilding Wooden vessels Hyundai shipyard Intl. scale
Machine Small car assembly Bus, truck assembly Parts development / 
automobile mfg. plant
Mass 
production 
(300K) / 
Exports
($150MN)
Precision
machinery large 
scale machinery
Electronics Radios, telephones TV Gumi complex Mini 
computer,
VTR
Semiconductors & 
Computers
Technology &
Engineering
Civil & architect Equipment sub contract / 
R&D by KIST
Scientists Specialised
research 
institute 
(Daeduk)
Plant engineering / 
Process 
development
Source: Planning Office, Heavy and Chemical Industry Promotion Council, Government of the Republic of Korea 1976
Sectoral targeting? – some industrial activity has a far-reaching 
impact on employment and technology across sectors
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1,471,710
1,603,000 
131,290 
264,502 
219,712 
233,839 
753,305 
Direct Employment Impact Indirect Employment Impact
Raw 
Materials
Parts & 
Assembly 
Manufacturing
AS & 
Repair
Roads & 
Services
Transportation & 
Logistics
Total 
Electric & 
Electronics 
38,084
Plastic
30,915
Rubber
11,747
Assembly
108,947
Auto Parts 
155,555
Car Sales 
57,309
Parts Sales 
38,756
Repair
123,647
Roads 
Construction & 
Management 
115,640
Gas Station 
Management 
67,404
Insurance 
18,890
Passenger
Vehicle 400,118
Freight Vehicles
215m249
Intermediaries
63,670
[CASE]  South Korea’s auto manufacturing related jobs
Source: Korea Development Bank, “South Korea’s Industry 2008”
10.4% in 
Total 
National 
Employment
(8%)
(16%)
(14%)
(15%)
(47%)
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Korea Taiwan Brazil Mexico
First 
Promotion Plan 1962 1961 1956 1962
Assembly Sector
Indigenous model 
development by 
local assemblers
Indigenous model 
development by 
local or foreign 
assemblers
Global production 
strategy by 
multinationals
Global production 
strategy by 
multinationals
Components 
Sector
Import 
substitution, 
subcontracting 
system
Import 
substitution
Import 
substitution Import substitution
Export Promotion Exports of indigenous model
Exports of foreign 
models and 
localized 
components
Exports of foreign 
models and 
localized 
components
Exports of foreign 
models and 
localized 
components
Production
(2003 vs. 2010)
3,177,870 
4,271,741
386,686 
303,456
1,827,038 
3,646,133
1,575,447 
2,347,524
Exports
(2003 vs. 2010)
1,814,938 
2,772,107
6,338
36,914 
534,740 
767,432
1,195,147
1,921,839 
Automotive industry in developing countries
0 
500 
1,000 
1,500 
2,000 
2,500 
3,000 
1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996
000units Production of motor vehicles(1966-97)
Korea Brazil Mexico Taiwan Canada UK
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Evolution of Industrial Policy in Korea: Auto Industry
000 units
Production
Heavy and Chemical 
Industrialization 
Program of 1973
Exports of localized 
heavy and chemical 
products
Import substitution of 
passenger cars within 3 
years
Volume production of 
Korean-type cars
A dominant market 
share guaranteed 
Combination of top-
down and bottom-up 
measures
Development and 
exports of small-
sized cars to the US 
market
Establishment of 
assembly lines 
specific to exports
Strong ties with 
multinationals(capital, 
sales network, etc)
Vertical 
subcontracting 
system
Global top 10 targeted
Inter-assembler competition
Production facilities expanded
Subcontracting system
Domestic sales promoted (interest-free 
installment financing)
 Vicious cycle of 
low capabilities, 
low scale 
economies and 
high prices
Korea’s auto industrial 
policy 
Technical evolution should be the underlying force of industrial 
development 
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Foundation
1962-1974
Heavy & 
Chemical
Industry push
1975-1981
Export drive
1982-1988
Home base
1989-1994
Character Kit assembly Local model, mass production
Restyling, JIT, 
front-wheel drive
Advanced design 
of engines and 
transmission
Local content (%) 30 85 97 97
Models produced 9 11 10 13
Mid-stage volume 14000 57000 264000 1000000~
Acquired
technology
Inspection, 
production 
management
New model 
development, 
quality control
Mass production, 
JIT, front-wheel 
drive, US 
standards
Design with 
advanced 
technology
Source: Hyun, Y.S. (1989) A technology strategy for the Korean motor industry; as cited in Auty, R. (1994) Economic Devel
opment and Industrial Policy, Ch.4
Development stages in the Korean automobile sector 
Development 
Stage
1960s
Support Export 
Development
- MOST/KIST
- S&T 
Promotion Act
- Five-Year 
Economic Plan 
Including S&T
1970s
Promote Heavy 
and Chemical 
Industries
- Government 
Research 
Institutes
- Technical and 
Vocation 
Schools
- R&D 
Promotion Act
- Daedeok 
Science Town
1980s
Shift from 
Industry 
Targeting to R&D 
Support
- National R&D 
Plan
- Private Sector 
Initiatives in 
R&D
1990s
Provide 
Information 
Infrastructure and 
R&D Support
- Informatization 
- E-Government
- GRI 
Restructuring
- U-I-G 
Linkages
2000s
Promote New 
Engines of 
Growth and 
Upgrade R&D
- Universities’ 
Leading Role
- Efficient NIS
- RIS and 
Innovation 
Clusters
Industrial 
Policy
S&T 
Policy
Factor-Driven Investment-Driven Innovation-Driven
Korea’s Transition Toward a Knowledge Economy
Korea’s transition toward a knowledge economy was intimately linked to export
promotion, industrial upgrading, and human resource development, and institution-
building was largely complete by the end of the 1980s.
Korea’s R&D Expenditure Trends
Source: World Bank (2007). Source: Ministry of Science and Technology, Bank of Korea
Per capita GDP (constant 2000 US$)
Gross R&D expenditure (% of GDP)
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2
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(% of GDP)
Gross R&D expenditure
Private
Public
Exposed to global competition, private-sector companies came to realize that innovation 
was key to their prosperity and dramatically increased their R&D expenditures. 
Part-04 Green Growth in Korea
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Environment and Directed Technical Change
 Acemoglu, Aghion, Bursztyn, and Hemous (2012), 
American Economic Review, 102(1), pp.131-166
• This paper introduces endogenous and directed 
technical change in a growth model with 
environmental constraints.
• The final good is produced from “dirty” and 
“clean” inputs.
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Environment and Directed Technical Change
This paper shows that:
 Sustainable growth can be achieved with temporary 
taxes/subsidies that redirect innovation toward clean inputs;
 Optimal policy involves both “carbon taxes” and research 
subsidies, avoiding excessive use of carbon taxes;
 Delay in intervention is costly, as it later necessitates a 
longer transition phase with slow growth; and
 Use of an exhaustible resource in dirty input production 
helps the switch to clean innovation under laissez-faire.
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Challenges in Green Growth Promotion
 Export Promotion
 Monitoring and Evaluation
 Public-Private Partnership
Green PPPs in Korea
Jongyearn (Jon) Lee, PhD
Public and Private 
Infrastructure Investment 
Management Center (PIMAC)
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Green PPPs in Korea Track RecordI
CONTENTS
II Green PPPs in Korea Effects
III
Green PPPs in Korea Current Issues
V Green PPPs in Korea Roadmap 
IV
Green PPPs in Korea Role of PIMAC, KDI
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I. Green PPPs in Korea Track Record
▣ Fields of Green PPPs
▣ Recent Track Record
① Sewer and Sewage Treatment Plants
② Livestock Wastewater Treatment Plants
③ Waste Disposal Facilities 
④ Wastewater Treatment Facilities 
⑤ Recycling Facilities
① Water Supply Facilities
< BTO facilities by type > < BTL (Sewage Treatment) by year >
USD 38.5M
USD 677M
USD 2,664M
ExcretionsWasteSewer
Total 63 projects Total 92 projects, 
USD 5.9 Billion  
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I. Green PPPs in Korea Track Record
▣ BTL Projects: Sewer
▣ BTO Projects: Sewerage, RDF Facilities, etc.
Total 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Length (km) 9,915 1,570 3,611 1,539 2,204 791 200
Cost (Mill$) 5,915 909 2,097 1,188 909 609 202
No. of Projects 92 17 29 15 16 11 4
Total Solicited Unsolicited
Cost (Mill$) Cnt. Cost (Mill$) Cnt. Cost (Mill$) Cnt.
3,380 63 426 16 2,954 47
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II. Green PPPs in Korea Effects
▣ Saving Budget through Negotiations
- Total Project Cost
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
Counts 17 22 8 13 9 69
Posted 957 1,331 621 787 481 4,177
Negotiated 841 1,041 551 740 458 3,631
Saved 116 290 70 47 23 546
- O&M Cost
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
Posted 127 423 149 193 122 1,014
Negotiated 110 263 111 165 99 747
Saved 17 160 38 28 23 267
Saved 13%
Saved 26%
(Unit: Million USD)
(Unit: Million USD)
)
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II. Green PPPs in Korea Effects
▣ Balanced Regional Development
Number of Companies: 249 Local > 155 Others
Average No. of Participating Companies per Project: 3.4 Local > 2.1 Others
⇒ Rising Proportion of Local Companies
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II. Green PPPs in Korea Effects
▣ Early Provision of Services
 Early Completion of Project with Efficient Financing
 Reducing Social Cost of Residents Incurred before Completion
 Raising Residents’ Benefit by Pre-Investment
USD 20M USD 20M
USD 12.5M<Completed in 2020>
<Completed in 2010>
Difference in Benefit by Completion Time
(A case of Jincheon BTL project, duration: 40 years, discount rate: 5%, Willingness-to-Pay: $6.11)
USD 32.5M
* Analysis of BTL Projects on Sewerage Facilities, Korea Environment Corporation
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III. Green PPPs in Korea Current Issues
▣ Changed paradigm from conventional processing facilities to low carbon 
emission and recycling type facilities using new renewable energy
▣ Increased needs for maintenance & improvement of old facilities (e.g. sewer)
▣ More demand/interest on projects for improving living environment 
(e.g. eco-friendly river parks)
▣ Introducing various and complex PPP methods
- Composite structure of BTO+BTL for linked projects 
(e.g. sewer + sewage treatment plant)
- Bundling for securing feasibility and O&M efficiency
(e.g. incineration + landfill + renewable fuels)
- Needs more for Rehabilitation (RTO/RTL) than Building(BTO/BTL)
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IV. Green PPPs in Korea Role of PIMAC, KDI
▣ KDI PIMAC enables comprehensive and systematic management of both 
traditional public investment and PPPs
Policy 
Research Unit
Public Entity Project  
Evaluation Unit
Program 
Evaluation UnitPFS Unit 1
RSF 
Unit
PPP Policy 
Unit
PPP Project 
Unit
Finance & Int’l 
Cooperation Unit
Policy and Research DivisionPublic Investment  Evaluation Division
Public-Private Partnerships 
Division
- Conduct and manage PFS
- Policy research on PIM
- Program Evaluation and Performance 
Management of Public Investment 
Projects
- Research on Methodology of Project 
Evaluation
- Appraisal for SOE Projects
- Conduct and manage RSF
- Formulate PPP Annual Plan and 
develop PPP guidelines
- Conduct Evaluation of PPP Projects 
- Research on PPP
- Financing and refinancing of PPP
- Capacity building and training 
- Infrastructure DB management
PFS Unit 2
Executive Director
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V. Green PPPs in Korea Roadmap
(Preliminary) Feasibility Studies Considering Characteristics of 
Environmental Facilities
Green PPP projects make great impacts on public
Indirect benefits should be considered for B/C analysis 
→ put more weights on policy analysis 
Objectivity, neutrality, and transparency of evaluation must be secured
→ establish/designate independent (specialized) organization(s) for evaluation
Government Subsidy Systems to Facilitate New Projects
Give incentives to green pilot projects 
Government subsidy programs should not be complicated and too different
by project type and by facility type
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V. Green PPPs in Korea Roadmap
Administrative Support for Resolving Complexity
Green PPP projects are hard to lead inter-regional cooperation (e.g. NIMBY)
Establish support system in accordance with trend of projects becoming 
complex more and more
Simplifying Process for Similar Projects with Identical Purpose
For similar projects with same purpose, simplify recurring review process 
required in Basic Plan for PPP to shorten construction period and raise 
efficiency  
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